State of Utah v. Catrina Marie Ottesen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Catrina Marie Ottesen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah State Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Michael D. Esplin; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin.
JAN GRAHAM UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 236 State Capital Salt Lake City, Utah
84114 Attorney for Appellee
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 43 East 200 North P.O. Box
"L" Provo.Utah 84603-0200 Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Ottesen, No. 950425 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6730





DOCKET NO. 35b f j j ^ f t 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CATRINA MARIE OTTESEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950425-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF GUILTY 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo.Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court rf Aopeals 
JAN 1 0 > »8 
Mar a -»ch 
Cler,, w. « ^ JO»J*I 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CATRINA MARIE OTTESEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950425-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF GUILTY 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I: THE COURT BASED ITS DECISION UPON FACTS 
NOT IN EVIDENCE AND THEREBY COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 5 
A: The Standard of Review 5 
B: The trial court based its decision upon facts not in evidence and 
thereby committed reversible error 5 
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHTS 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RESULTED 
FROM AN ILLEGAL DETENTION AND SEARCH OF THE 
APPELLANT 6 
A: The Standard of Review 6 
B: The evidence obtained against the Appellant was obtained in 
violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment and 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) 10 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1960) 7 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) 8 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 8 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 10 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) 6 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 2, 4 
State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) 5, 6 
State v. Ziegleman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 7 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed2d 889 (1968) 10 
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Circuit 1991), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 822 8 
Statutes Page 
Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 6 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953), as amended 1 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CATRINA MARIE OTTESEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950425-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park, 
denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress following an evidentiary hearing and from final judgment 
of conviction and sentence following a conditional plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance in 
a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, said judgment having been entered June 8, 1995. 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in denying appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of her right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Katrina Marie Ottesen, for one count of Possession 
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of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute Within a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree 
Felony. Following the denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence after an evidentiary 
hearing, Appellant, pursuant to plea agreement and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), 
entered a plea of guilty to said charge. Sentence was imposed upon the Appellant on June 8, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle owned by her, but operated by another traveling 
eastbound on 400 South at approximately 800 West in Orem, Utah, on January 6, 1994. An Orem 
City police officer in plain clothes in an unmarked car was also traveling in the same direction when 
he noticed the appellant's vehicle directly behind his vehicle. The officer felt that the appellant's 
vehicle was too close to his vehicle for safety and he pulled to the side of the road, let the vehicle 
pass, and then turned on a red light in order to stop the appellant's car. The driver stopped in 
response to the red light and the officer (Officer Gary McGiven) approached the driver and identified 
himself as an Orem City police officer. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, pp.3-6) 
The officer testified that he obtained the license of the driver, Damon Littlefield, and also the 
registration of the vehicle. The officer did not note any problems with the license nor the registration 
to the vehicle, but noticed the smell of alcohol about the driver and upon running a warrant check, 
determined that he had an outstanding warrant. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, pp. 12-14.) Officer McGiven 
detained both the driver and the appellant for approximately 15 minutes prior to making a 
determination to request the assistance of an additional officer, Officer Fish. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, p. 
15) After officer Fish arrived, the two officers had some discussion and observations of the driver, 
Mr. Littlefield, and then Officer McGiven approached the vehicle and confronted the appellant for 
the first time. Officer McGiven testified that he had already determined that the driver had an 
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outstanding warrant and alcohol on his breath before he made contact with the Appellant. (Tran. 
Hrg. 9/26/94, pp. 15-16) 
McGiven indicated that he had some question about the age of the appellant, but had smelled 
no alcohol on her person. His first question of her was to inquire as to whether or not there was any 
alcohol in the vehicle. The appellant did not reply, but reached down to the floorboard of the car and 
handed him a six-pack carton containing five unopened bottles of beer. There was no further 
exchange at that time. The officer had obtained the license of the appellant which showed her to be 
under 21 years of age. He had no further contact with the appellant at that time and had her remain 
in the vehicle. Officer McGiven returned to the area where Officer Fish was giving the driver field 
sobriety tests and remained there until the tests were completed. There was then a discussion between 
Officer Fish and Officer McGiven about how they were going to handle the appellant's situation. 
Officer McGiven indicated that they determined that they should search the vehicle for contraband 
and that they would give the appellant the option of consenting to the search of her vehicle in which 
case they would merely give her a citation for the minor in possession of alcohol charge or if she 
refused to consent to the search, they would then arrest her and search incident to the arrest. (Tran. 
Hrg. 9/26/94, pp. 21-23) 
The officer approached the appellant and presented her with the two alternatives and appellant 
refused to consent to the search. Officer McGiven indicated that there is no specific policy of the 
Orem City Police Department concerning whether or not officers should arrest a minor charged with 
possession of alcohol or simply issue a citation. He also testified that he does it both ways, 
"depending upon the circumstances". (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, p.33) Prior to conducting a search, the 
officers had not smelled marijuana nor had any evidence that controlled substances or paraphernalia 
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might be present in the vehicle. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, p.25) 
After placing the appellant under arrest for being a minor in possession of alcohol, the officers 
searched her vehicle and found a quantity of marijuana in the vehicle. They then .searched the 
appellant's person and found some "rolling papers" in her coat pocket. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94, pp. 40-
41) Appellant was placed under arrest and charged with Possession of Marijuana in a Drug Free 
Zone, Illegal Drug Tax, Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, and 
Unlawful Possession /Consumption of Alcohol. Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence 
obtained raising the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure, and after 
a hearing was held, the Court denied the motion, finding that the detention of the Appellant was not 
unreasonable since the driver exhibited " signs of intoxication" and did not have a valid license. 
(Addendum Exhibit "A"). 
Following the denial of appellant's pretrial motions, the appellant entered into a plea bargain 
wherein she conditionally pled guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, to Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone upon the condition that she retain the right to appeal the trial court's 
rulings on her motions. Appellant was sentenced on June 8, 1995. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The lower court committed reversible error in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
evidence where the Appellant was a passenger in her own vehicle and the driver stopped for a traffic 
violation and then arrested on a warrant. The ruling of the court was based not supported by the 
evidence and did not apply the law correctly to the facts. The detention of the Appellant exceeded 
that allowed for legitimate purposes where the officer had no probable cause to detain her further, 
she was the owner of the vehicle, and the officer had no articulable reason to believe she was in 
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violation of the law or to detain her for an unreasonable time. The detention of the Appellant 
exceeded constitutional limits and the court should have suppressed the evidence obtained by the 
search following said illegal detention. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DECISION UPON FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE AND 
THEREBY COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
A. The Standard of Review 
The standard of review of factual findings of a trial court is that of clearly erroneous. State 
v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. The trial court based its decision upon facts not in evidence and thereby committed 
reversible error. 
In paragraph 9 of the Memorandum Decision of the trial court, the court based its 
determination upon two facts not supported by the evidence. (Addendum, page 3) The first, was the 
assumption that the driver did not possess a valid driver's licence. Although the officer during direct 
examination testified that he ran a check on the defendant's driver's licence, he stated that he "could 
not recall" whether the licence was valid or not. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94 p. 8) Upon cross examination, 
he again indicated that he did not recall whether or not the licence of the driver was suspended, but 
admitted that if that were the case he would have issued a citation. (Tran. Hrg. 9/26/94 pi 2) There 
was no competent evidence upon which the court could reach the conclusion that the licence of the 
driver was not valid. 
Secondly, the court relied upon a finding that the officer observed signs of intoxication in the 
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defendant. The officer's testimony on that point was that he didn't really notice anything unusual 
about him at the time he spoke with him and that he smelled the "slight" odor of alcohol on his breath. 
After he got the driver 01 it of the ca i ai id » a s in closei pi oxim it) " fc : I: im the od : i was a lot stronger. 
(Tran. Hrg. 9/24/94 pp. 7-8) Appellant argues that the above evidence does not constitute "signs of 
intoxication" which would justify tuilliei dclnnlioii of the dnivn, an I in any mi l l the intoxication of 
the driver would not justify the further detention of the Appellant for the reasons cited in Appellant's 
argument set forth in Point II below. 
POINT n 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS OBTAINED IN 
VIOLATION OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
RESULTED FROM AN ILLEGAL DETENTION AND SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT. 
A The Standard of Review. 
The standard of review It i determining the conclusions ol law iinide by a Dial not n t ii i denying 
a Motion to Suppress is that of correctness. State v. Stewart, 806 at 215. 
B The evidence obtained against the Appellant was obtained in violation of her rights under 
the Fourth Amendment and resulted from an illegal detention and search of the Appellant. 
A police officer who stops a vehicle for a traffic violation his detention of the vehicle and the 
occupants is limited to the* tun*' necessais (u An A to exannw tin In tnsc am) vehicle leyi.itration 
In State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court defined the parameters 
of the traffic stop In Schlosser, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle operated by another 
which was stopped by an officer for a speeding violation. The officer indicated that he had observed 
unusual behavior on the part of the defendant passenger which caused him suspect drug involvement. 
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passenger side of the vehicle and asked the defendant passenger for identification. The officer opened 
the passenger door to make his inquiry and at that time observed a bag of marijuana in the passenger 
door pocket. He also smelled the order of marijuana smoke. At that point he arrested the occupants 
and a further search revealed additional bags of marijuana. (774 P.2d 1132, at 1134) 
Citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1960), the court 
opined that an individual does not lose Fourth Amendment protection when an oflBcer stops a vehicle 
for a traffic violation, but that the detention of the occupants must be brief. The court went on to find 
that the officers acts in detaining the vehicle and occupants exceeded the scope of that necessary for 
a traffic stop and that the further contact with the passenger by opening the passenger door 
constituted an illegal search. (774 P.2d 1132, at 1135.) 
In the present case, as set forth in the facts above, the officer stopped the vehicle for a traffic 
violation, obtained license and registration information from the driver and identification from the 
passenger, all valid. The officer then continued to detain the occupants of the vehicle while he did 
a warrants check on the driver. After he had obtained information on the driver and also determined 
that he smelled alcohol on the breath of the driver, he continued to detain both parties for at least 15 
minutes while waiting for a backup officer to arrive. He had no reason to believe that any contraband 
was in the vehicle at that time during which the parties were detained. In fact, prior to confronting 
the Appellant after the backup officer had arrived and had started giving the driver field sobriety tests, 
he had not smelled any alcohol on the person of the Appellant nor smelled marijuana nor had any 
indication that the Appellant had violated any law. At the time of his further contact with the 
Appellant, he asked if there was alcohol in the vehicle and Appellant without comment produced 
some unopened beer from the interior of the vehicle. That contact and questioning exceeded 
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constitutionally permissible conduct by the police officer and the Appellant's compliance with the 
officer's question does not provide a basis for admission of the alcohol nor the controlled substances 
subsequently discovered after further search of the \ eh icle The officer's inquiry to the Appellant 
concerning the presence of any alcohol in the vehicle violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
In State v. Godma I uiiij, K/o I"
 L\j uSl (1 If ah App l '^h.!) (he > ml louriil tin questioning of 
motorists stopped for suspected traffic violations exceeded constitutional limits when the officers 
asked whether there was any alcohol, drugs, or firearms in the vehicle. The court further held that 
any such inquiry justifying detention beyond that necessary to complete the purpose of the initial stop 
was improper absent some "reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity" on the part of the 
defendants. Finding none the count found the detention to exeeed tin ii'ope i it the slop 1 uilhei the 
court also held that the consent of the defendant to the search of the vehicle occurred during an 
"ongoing illegal seizure" tin is nc time factor separated the illegality fit 01 n the consei- ^ . <• 
at 655. In the present case, Appellant was being illegally detained at the time the officer questioned 
her about the presence of alcohol in the vehicle therefore any compliance with the question is subject 
to suppression. Also, in State v. Ziegleman, 2 76 I Jta h k d\ R c j 56, th is c out t reaffirmed the 
motorist's right not to be detained beyond the time necessary to deal with the reason for the stop. 
InZiegleman, the state conceded dial (In. oltnei had *Klrd niipn*|n ily b> detaining occupants of"a 
vehicle beyond the time which was necessary to complete the investigation of the traffic stop. The 
court cited also United States v. Walker, 933 V M KIJ | iOth Circuit 1991), cert denied, 484 11 S 
822, which held that questioning of the type which occurred in this case was improper during a 
routine traffic stop. 
A fter obtaining tlie alrulml from tht iippt Hani, the olfieei ilnl tioi tine ,t the Appellant hull 
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returned to observe the backup officer conduct the field sobriety tests on the driver. Following the 
completion of the tests on the driver, the two officers then had a conversation about how to proceed 
further with the Appellant, to wit; whether they would simply cite her and release her for being a 
minor in possession of alcohol, or whether they would then arrest her for that offense. The 
determination that the Appellant would be placed under arrest was dependent on whether she 
consented to the further search of the vehicle. When she did not, the Appellant was arrested for the 
minor violation and the vehicle was searched. 
The Utah Supreme Court again considered a case with very similar facts in State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761 ( Utah 1991). The officer in Johnson stopped a vehicle in which the defendant was a 
passenger for an equipment violation. The officer had run a check on the registration of the vehicle 
prior to stopping the vehicle and obtained the name of the registered owner. The officer asked the 
driver for her driver's licence which was not the same name as the registered owner. The officer then 
asked the passenger for identification. The defendant passenger then did not produce a driver's 
licence or other form of identification, but gave the officer her name and date of birth. The officer 
then returned to his vehicle and ran a warrants check on the occupants discovering that the driver had 
a suspended driver's license and the passenger had outstanding warrants for her arrest. The officer 
returned to the vehicle and issued a citation to the driver and informed the passenger that she was 
under arrest for outstanding warrants. When the passenger exited the vehicle, she was carrying a 
backpack which was subsequently searched and found to contain a quantity of controlled substances. 
805 P.2d 761, at 762. The court held that the officer's detention of the passenger for the time it took 
to check for warrants was unreasonable and suppressed the evidence as being violative of the fourth 
amendment rights of the passenger. 805 P.2d 761, at 764. 
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In arriving at the decision, the coin t considered tl le i \ lie set foi tin, in 1\ ?/ ry ' v. Ohio, 392 t J.S 
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed2d 889 (1968) wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that the 
length and scope of the detention must 1 >e "sti ictl> tied t' »'« » 1 ji istifk d by the circumstance s wl lich 
rendered its initiation permissible." 3 9 2 U . S . 1, at 19-2C. m the present case, the driver identified 
h imse l f w i t h a valid l icence and the registration w a s in order. There w a s n o need for any further 
contact with the Appellant passenger. Further, u p o n determining that the driver had an outstanding 
warrant, or that he w a s a minor wi th the smell o f alcohol o n his person, the officer had n o need or 
justification for the continued detention ot tin- Appellant II nol pi mi, at Iras! ,i! the l ime when hv 
made the decision to detain the driver for field sobriety tests to be conducted by an officer who was 
not as yet present, the Appellant slii it 1 la v ebeen detained fui thei W it'll 11 ler registration being 
valid and proper, she should have been allowed to leave the area. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 
107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) held that even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope 
of an initially lawful search was unlawful. See also State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, in which this 
court held that the search of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation was unconstitutional even though 
consent was given during the period of unlawful detention. 
In the present case, the officer had no legitimate purpose in even asking the for the identity 
of the Appellant upon stopping the vehicle, and certainly had no legitimate purpose for detaining for 
at least 15 minutes while he waited for an additional officer to give field sobriety tests to the driver. 
In fact, after the initial determination that ^ n tl 1?-
leg i t imate purpose t o detain the passenger. The officer had already determined that the driver had 
a warrant for his arrest and that he was in violation of the not a drop" law. There was no legitimate 
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purpose for detaining the Appellant past that initial determination. There was no claim that there was 
a necessity to determine whether the Appellant held a valid operator's licence or to contact her for 
any other reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court committed 
reversible error in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress and that her conviction in this matter 
should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 1996. 
MICHAEL JZJ.ESPLIN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 8th day of January, 1996, four (4) copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953), as amended 
Exhibit "A": Memorandum Decision of Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, dated 
1/9/95 
Memorandum In Support Defendants' Motion to Suppress, filed by Ron D. Wilkinson, dated 7/5/94 
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78-2-5 JUDICIAL CODE 390 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court ofAppeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1886 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986, 1988 
CHAPTER 2a 







Terms — Functions — 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges 
Filing fees. 
Court ofAppeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court ofAppeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal . 
There is created a court known as the Court ofAppeals. The 
Court ofAppeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court ofAppeals consists of seven judges. The term 
3f appointment to office as a judge of the Court ofAppeals is 
ontil the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
cerm of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
-equest of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
raction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court ofAppeals shall sit and render judgment in 
oanels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
-andom rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
3ourt of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
:hair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court ofAppeals shall elect a presid-
ng judge from among the members of the court by majority 
/ote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
wo years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
he Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two 
recessive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for 
m acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
)f the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
res iding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
ippeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
ippeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court ofAppeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court ofAppeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court ofAppeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court ofAppeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
mat te r over which the Court ofAppeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1995 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e C o u r t . 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of C o u r t o f A p p e a l s . 
The Court ofAppeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court ofAppeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Religious and political freedom.} 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT m 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted 
AMENDMENT DC 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain righU 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are rese 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial pc 
The judicial power of the United States shall not 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, comme 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreig 
AMENDMENT XH 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, i 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of w 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same ete 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the pers-
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person vot 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists oi 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons vote 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, wl 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to th 
the Government of the United States, directed to U 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate she 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives 
the certificates and the votes shall then be count 
person having the greatest number of votes for P 
shall be the President, if such number be a majori 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no per 
such majority, then from the persons having th* 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those vot 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose 
atel>, by ballot, the President But in choosing the I 
the votes shall be taken by states, the represents 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this pur} 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds oft 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary U 
And if the House of Representatives shall not 
President whenever the right of choice shall dev< 
them, before the fourth day of March next following 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the a 
death or other constitutional disability of the Presid 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-] 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majc 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no pere 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on th 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorui 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole i 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutional!} 
to the office of President shall be eligible to the 
President of the United States. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD DAMON LITTLEFIELD, 
CATRINA MARIE OTTENSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 941400179 
CASE NO. 941400180 
DATE January 9, 1995 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress, filed on July 6, 
1994, and a suppression hearing held September 26, 1994. At the suppression hearing, Utah 
County Attorney James R. Taylor appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Richard Damon Littlefield was present with his attorney Shelden R. Carter, and 
defendant Catrina Maria Ottenson was present with her attorney Michael Espiin. Officers 
Gary McGiven and Wayne Fish were sworn and testified before the Court. Defendants were 
given ten days to submit supplemental memoranda to the Court and Mr. Taylor was given 
five days to respond. On October 7, 1994, the State filed a Request For Ruling based upon 
the briefs and arguments already presented, since neither defendant submitted supplemental 
memoranda during the ten days specified by the Court. 
The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, memorandum in support, 
memorandum in opposition, and the applicable law, and having heard testimony and oral 
arguments, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. On January 6, 1994, defendants were arrested for (a) being minors in possession of 
alcohol; (b) for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; (c) for possession of drug 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
paraphernalia; and (d) for violating the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act. Defendant Littlefield 
was also arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure to appear on a traffic violation, 
2. The arrests were made subsequent to a traffic stop made by Sergeant McGiven of 
the Orem Department of Public Safety. Defendant Littlefield was driving defendant 
Ottenson's car, in which Ottenson was a passenger, when Sergeant McGiven stopped 
Littlefield for following the officer's vehicle too closely. 
3. While talking with defendant Littlefield, Sergeant McGiven observed that 
Littlefield's eyes were glazed, his pupils appeared abnormally constricted, and his speech 
was slow and thick. Littlefield told Sergeant McGiven that he did not have his driver's 
license with him, so the officer ran a check on Littlefield for his driver's license and for 
outstanding warrants. Upon being advised that there was an outstanding warrant on 
Littlefield for failure to appear on a traffic violation, Sergeant McGiven asked Littlefield to 
step out of the car. As Littlefield complied, Sergeant McGiven noticed the smell of alcohol. 
Because Sergeant McGiven was not on duty, he requested assistance from Officer Wayne 
Fish, who conducted sobriety tests on Defendant Littlefield. 
4. Defendant Ottenson surrendered a carton of beer to Sergeant McGiven. Sergeant 
McGiven placed Ottenson and Littlefield under arrest for being minors in possession of 
alcohol, and Sergeant McGiven conducted a search of the whole car incident to the arrests. 
5. During the search of the car, Sergeant McGiven found drug paraphernalia and 
marijuana, some of which appeared to be packaged for resale. Both defendants were then 
placed under arrest for possession of marijuana and intent to distribute within a drug-free 
zone. 
6. The Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Suppress alleges that 
defendants were arrested 18 minutes after the car was searched, and that the search was 
therefore not made incident to a lawful arrest. However, evidence presented indicates that 
both defendants were arrested on the charge of possession of alcohol by minors and that 
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defendant Littlefield was arrested on the outstanding warrant, and that the search of the car 
was lawfully made incident to these arrests. The arrests for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and violation of the Illegal Drug Tax 
Stamp Act were then made at the conclusion of the search of the car. 
8. Defendants also argue that the warrants check was unjustified and therefore 
improper. Defendants cite State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), in support of their 
position. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that running a warrants check arguably 
exceeds the reasonable scope of the traffic stop when the officer has no reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense itself. However, Utah case law allows officers 
to run a warrants check in connection with a traffic stop "so long as it does not significantly 
extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license 
and valid registration and to issue a citation." See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994). See also State v. Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Chapman. 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
9. In the present case, Sergeant McGiven testified that he observed signs of 
intoxication in defendant Littlefield and that Littlefield did not have a driver's license. Each 
of these circumstances provide justification for the warrants check run by Sergeant McGiven, 
and the question of whether Littlefield was driving under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance would necessitate extending the duration of the traffic stop for purposes 
of ensuring public safety. For these reasons, the Court finds that Sergeant McGiven's 
actions in running a warrants check on defendant Littlefield were appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
10. Defendants also cite Utah case law holding it impermissible for police to use a 
misdemeanor arrest as an excuse to search for evidence of a more serious crime. See State 
v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), overruled in part on other erounds; State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Defendants argue that since penalties for the crime of 
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possession of alcohol by a minor are not affected by the quantity of alcohol involved, and 
since defendant Ottenson had voluntarily surrendered a carton of beer, Sergeant McGiven 
had no need to search the car in an attempt to find more alcohol. Defendants maintain that 
the officers' search of the car was therefore made solely to seek evidence of a more serious 
crime. 
11. The State cites the U.S. Supreme Court case of California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 
565 (1991) as specifically authorizing the search of a defendant's automobile, based upon an 
arrest made when an officer has probable cause to believe the defendant committed an 
offense. The State also argues that the evidence located in defendant's car was also properly 
obtained during an inventory of the vehicle conducted in accordance with established 
inventory procedures of the Utah County Sheriffs Office. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976); Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and State v. Earl. 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (holding that a search of defendant's automobile trunk was proper 
under the ruling of Carroll). 
12. Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby denies 
defendants' Motion To Suppress Evidence. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 9th day of January, 1995. 
THE COURTS 
dC 
BOYD L. PAftC JUDGE 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin 
Shelden R. Carter 
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Ron D. Wilh'nson (5558) 
Attorney at L< \v 
1139 South Orcn- 31\d. 
Orem, Utah 8405S 
(801) 225-7909 Pax (801) 225-0842 
Attorney for Defendant 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, : DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
v. : 
CATRINA OTTESON, : 
Civil No, 941400180 
Defendant. : 
Comes now defendant Catrina Otteson, by and through her attorney, Ron. D. 
Wilkinson, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of her Motion to 
Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On January 6, 1994, at approximately 16:55 hours, Sergeant Gary McGiven, 
Orem City P.D., recognized the driver of a vehicle, Mr. Damion Littlefield, travelling 
eastbound on 800 west in Orem. (Police Report fl II.) Sergeant McGiven stated that said 
recognition came from prior criminal dealings. 
2. Sergeant McGiven stopped the vehicle, claiming it was "following too close."1 
(Police Report j^ I.) 
1
 The driver of the vehicle did not receive a citation for this traffic violation. 
He testified that he was suspicious that he would find proof of other crimes due to 
Defendant's Litdefield's "reputation." (Preliminary Hearing Tape Recording). 
9. During the search of Hie vehicle, Sergeant McGiven looked inside a sealed book 
bag and discovered marijuana. (Police Report |^ VI.) 
10. Sergeant McGiven then searched inside a sealed sports bag that was located 
within the hatchback of the vehicle. This bag also contained marijuana. (Police Report 
11 VII.) 
11. Sergeant McGiven reports that he then placed Mr. Litdefield and Ms. Otteson 
under arrest4 for the possession of marijuana and intent to distribute in a school zone.5 
(Police Report fl VIII). 
12. However, Officer Fish reported the arrest took place at 17:58 hours, over one 
(1) hour6 after the defendants were pulled over. (DUI Report Form § I.) 
13. Officer Fish reported that the search of the vehicle occurred at 17:40 hours, 
18 minutes before the arrests took place. (DUI Report Form § IX.) 
14. Despite Sergeant McGiven's assertion of searching the vehicle pursuant to 
Littlefleld's reputation? 
4
 Did he search the vehicle before the arrest? 
5
 The fact that the defendants were in a drug free zone is a mere coincidence, due solely to the fact 
that the traffic stop happened to occur within a drug free zone. 
Case law requires the officer account for each minute of this unreasonable lime of detainment. 
3 
arrest, Officer Fish listed himself as the only arresting officer. (DUI Report Form § I). 
MEMORANDUM OF AtTTHORITIES 
The Fourth Amendment grants citizens the right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
This mandate is subject to few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Warrantless searches have been upheld 
in limited circumstances under the exceptions referred to in Katz, supra. State v. Harris, 
671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). 
The exceptions to warrantless searches include searches and seizures incident to a 
lawful arrest based on probable cause under exigent circumstances and the automobile 
exception. Id., citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
It is important to note that the state has the burden to show that such an exception 
applies in this circumstance. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 783 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990). 
The matter at hand does not fall within one of these "jealously drawn" exceptions 
for the following reasons: 
1) Sergeant McGiven's conducting a warrants check on Mr. Littlefield was not 
justified and therefore "severed the chain of rational inference" and "degenerated 
4 
3. Sergeant McGiven testified that upon approaching Mr; Littlefield, he did not 
observe anything suspicious with respect to the serious charges be later filed. 
4. Without any legitimate motive, Sergeant McGiv6n ran a warrants check on 
Mr, Littlefield and discovered an outstanding warrant for failure to appear on a speeding 
violation. (Police Report fl III.) 
5. Since Sergeant McGiven was not on duty, not a routine traffic officer, and not 
in uniform, he requested that Officer Wayne Fish respond to conduct sobriety tests on Mr. 
Littlefield. (Police Report fl IV.) 
6. For no apparent reason, Sergeant McGiven then asked the vehicle's passenger, 
Catrina Otteson,2 if there was any alcohol in the vehicle. Ms. Otteson voluntarily 
surrendered to the officer a carton of beer, with five full 12 oz. bottles of beer. (Police 
Report U IV.) 
7. Despite her cooperation, Sergeant McGiven claims to have placed both Ms. 
Otteson and Mr. Littlefield under arrest. Said arrest took place almost an hour after the 
stipulation, he then proceeded to search the entire vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. 
(Police Report fl VI.) 
8. Sergeant McGiven testified that he was "possibly" searching for more alcohol.3 
2
 Ms. Ottenson is also the owner of the vehicle. 
3
 The alcohol charge docs not require a particular amount of alcohol. Sergeant McGiven had 
voluntarily received all the evidence he needed to charge the defendant's with the alcohol charge. Why 
search for more alcohol unless he was "fishing" for evidence of a more serious charge for someone of Mr. 
2 
into an attempt to support an as yet inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch." See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,-27 (1968); 
2) The misdemeanor arrest was an excuse to allow Sergeant McGiven an 
opportunity to explore the vehicle for evidence of a more serious crime; 
3) Sergeant McGiven had no probable cause to search the vehicle incident to 
a lawful arrest; 
4) The arrest took place a full 18 minutes after the search. 
I. A WARRANTS CHECK WAS NOT JUSTIFIED 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that any investigative questioning that further 
detains a driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled in Johnson that running a warrants check without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity beyond the traffic offense itself arguably exceeds the reasonable scope of the 
traffic stop. Once a traffic stop is made, the detention "must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 11, quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
In Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. at 500, the Court reasoned that, "the leap from asking 
for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check on her severed the 
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chain of rational inference from the specific articulable facts and degenerated into an 
attempt to support an as yet inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1958). 
The court continues in Lopez: 
The "reasonable scope" requirement precludes the officer from investigating 
such motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic offense 
because the detention can "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The 
purpose of the stop is to request a driver's license and a valid registration, 
run a computer check on the car and/or the driver, and issue a citation. 
Unsupported by further probable cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by 
the officer to investigate suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense 
unconstitutionally extend detention beyond the scope of the circumstances 
that rendered it permissible. Thus, existing Fourth Amendment law 
precludes an officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to 
investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion." Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 
(emphasis added). 
Although the recent Lopez decision backed off the strong stance taken in Johnson, 
the court still believes "an officer's subjective suspicions unrelated to the traffic violation 
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for which he or-she stops a defendant can be used by defense counsel to show the officer 
fabricated the violation." Id. at 15. 
Sergeaiit McGiven's running the warrants check was an act that severed the chain 
of rational inference. Damion was never even cited for "following too close." Sergeant 
McGiven testified, "I had a suspicion about a lot of things." However, he had no probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion justifying his unwarranted check or search of Defendant's 
vehicle. Lopez clearly supports defendant's contention that Officer Given's "subjective 
suspicions unrelated to the traffic violation" are not sufficient to search the vehicle. 
Therefore, the evidence gathered in the search is not admissible. 
II. THE MISDEMEANOR ARREST WAS AN EXCUSE TO SEARCH FOR 
EVIDENCE OF A MORE SERIOUS CRIME 
It is impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as an 
excuse to search for evidence of a more serious crime. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 
(Utah App. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). See United States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (it is 
impermissible to use an arrest as an excuse to search for evidence). Accord United States 
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961) (where an 
arrest is a sham being used as an excuse for making a search, the ensuing search is 
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illegal). 
The violation of a constitutional right by a subterfuge cannot be justified.... 
Were the use of misdemeanor arrests warrants as a pretext for searching 
people suspected of felonies to be permitted, a mockery could be made of 
the Fourth Amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to 
detect and prevent such a misuse of legal processes. IcL, citing Taglavore, 
291 F.2d at 266. 
The present case presents a clear case of "pretext. . . searching." There was no 
probable cause to search the vehicle. Sergeant McGiven stated that he was "possibly" 
searching for more alcohol. Since Ms. Otteson had voluntarily produced all of the alcohol 
in the vehicle and since penalties are the same for a minor in possession of alcohol no 
matter the quantity, and because the vehicle was being impounded since both passengers 
were arrested, the only possible motivation for Sergeant McGiven to search the vehicle 
was to search for evidence of a more serious crime. 
Sergeant McGiven's admission that he was suspicious of other activities since he 
was familiar with Mr. Littlefield's reputation supports a conclusion that he was not 
searching for more alcohol but was instead searching for evidence of a more serious 
crime. This objective is strictly prohibited by the constitution. This court should suppress 
the evidence gathered after the traffic stop to "prevent such a misuse of [the] legal 
process." Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 266. 
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III. SERGEANT McGIVEN HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE 
VEHICLE INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 
There is a discrepancy between the DUI Report filed by Officer Fish, the arresting 
officer, and the account given by Sergeant McGiven in his report. Sergeant McGiven 
asserts that he placed Mr. Littlefield and Ms. Otteson under arrest and then proceeded to 
search the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. However, Officer Fish's report clearly 
indicates that the search occurred prior to the arrest and the arrest occurred only after the 
marijuana had been confiscated. Therefore, the evidence obtained in the search should 
be inadmissible. 
Additionally, there appears to be no probable cause for Sergeant McGiven to ask 
defendant Otteson, the passenger and owner of the car, if there was any beer in the car. 
This contention further supports defendant's request to suppress the evidence obtained 
after the stop. 
IV. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
The automobile exception applies if the police have "probable cause to believe that 
the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime that may be lost if not 
immediately seized." Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411. 
The automobile exception does not apply in this case because according to Sergeant 
McGiven's account both Ms. Otteson and Mr. Littlefield had been placed under arrest 
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before the search took place and the vehicle was, therefore, being impounded. As a result, 
there was no risk that evidence: of another crime would be lost. 
Moreover, Ms. Otteson has voluntarily-delivered the alcohol to the officer when 
such action was requested. Additionally, the officer had no incentive to search for more 
alcohol since the quantity of alcohol has no bearing on the penalty for the unlawful 
purchase, possession, consumption of alcohol by minors under Utah Code 32A-12-209, 
a class B misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent 
circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained. State v. Christensen, 676 
P.2d 408 (Utah 1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless 
exigencies of situation justify exception); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, denied, 
454 U.S. 1057 (1981) (searches and seizures are per se unreasonable if concluded without 
a warrant). An officer may search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest, however the facts 
suggest that the search may have occurred before the arrest. 
The carefully guarded exceptions to the Fourth Amendment do not permit officers 
to conduct "fishing expeditions" through a vehicle in order to obtain evidence of more 
serious crimes. The marijuana seized during Sergeant McGiven's expedition through 
Catrina Otteson's vehicle should be suppressed because the search lacked a warrant or 
10 
sufficient probable cause. 
DATED this " w l a v of^unfcT1994. 
Ron D. Wilkinson 
Attorney for Defendant Otteson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Nc*k^=ef-
Ggg&maace was hand-delivered to the following this 09 day/ofAfejte, 1994. 
Sheldon R. Carter 
CARTER, PHILLIPS & WILKINSON 
Jamestown Square 
Clocktower Bldg., Suite 200 
3325 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Jim Taylor 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
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